

THE UNITED STATES, PAKISTAN AND THE SOVIET THREAT
TO SOUTHERN ASIA: OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS

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ABSTRACT

Three problems related to U.S.-Pakistan security ties complicate the efforts of the United States to deter the expansion of Soviet influence in southern Asia: 1) the present military "stalemate" in Afghanistan and potential differences between the United States and Pakistan over approaches towards that conflict; 2) Pakistan's apparent continued pursuit of a nuclear weapons option; and 3) continuing tension between Pakistan and India. This report analyzes options available to U.S. policy makers to reconcile competing policy objectives and relates them to specific opportunities for Congress to exercise its influence.



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SUMMARY

Despite the achievement of closer U.S. security cooperation with Pakistan under a six-year, \$3.2 billion aid program begun in late 1981, unresolved conflicts in U.S.-Pakistan relations and prevailing conditions in South Asia complicate the efforts of the United States to deter the expansion of Soviet influence in southern Asia. 1/ Three problems seem most acutely threatening to U.S. objectives: 1) the present military "stalemate" in Afghanistan, which may work to the advantage of the Soviet Union over the longer term; 2) Pakistan's apparent continued pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, in competition with India, which increases instability in the South Asian region and raises the possibility of a future legislatively mandated cutoff of U.S. aid; and 3) the long-standing rivalry between Pakistan and India, which has a growing nuclear component and may offer opportunities for exploitation by the Soviet Union to expand its influence in the region at U.S. expense.

The following report analyzes options to influence these problems and to reconcile competing U.S. policy objectives. Congress influences the U.S. response to these problems directly by setting the levels and terms of U.S. military and economic assistance to Pakistan, authorizing and appropriating other funds related to the Afghanistan situation, and exercising oversight and

1/ Although traditionally considered part of South Asia -- i.e., the subcontinent -- Pakistan occupies a transition zone between South Asia and the Persian Gulf region, or West Asia. Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan it has become popular to use the term Southwest Asia in regard to Pakistan, Iran, and the Persian Gulf. Southern Asia, as used in this study, refers to both South and Southwest Asia.

legislative powers relating to arms sales and nuclear proliferation policy. The congressional role is especially important in view of impending negotiations on continued U.S. arms sales and assistance to Pakistan after the completion of the current six-year aid program, and the necessity of specific legislative action to permit the continuance of U.S. aid after September 30, 1987. 2/

Analysis of U.S. Policy Options

The Afghanistan "Stalemate" and Soviet Policy Towards Pakistan

The ability of the United States to influence the conflict in Afghanistan depends heavily on the U.S.-Pakistan security relationship. Pakistan plays a key role in providing a safe haven for Afghan refugees and resistance fighters and, reportedly, facilitating the flow of arms to the anti-Soviet guerrillas.

Pakistan's willingness to cooperate with U.S. policy depends on: 1) the nature of U.S. policy; 2) Pakistan's own policy goals and their compatibility with U.S. objectives; 3) the capability of the Soviet Union to dissuade Pakistan from cooperating with the United States.

U.S. Policy. While the general goal of opposing the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan through support of the Afghan resistance has broad public support, the specific objectives of U.S. policy, and how the United States should pursue them, remain a matter of controversy. Objectives of participants in the U.S. policy debate thus appear to range from delaying a Soviet consolidation of power while not overly exposing Pakistan to Soviet pressure or military retaliation,

2/ Under the terms of Section 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act, the so-called Symington amendment, Pakistan is currently ineligible for U.S. assistance on account of its acquisition of unsafeguarded uranium enrichment technology. Section 620E of the Foreign Assistance Act, however, waives the applicability of the Symington Amendment to Pakistan under certain conditions until September 30, 1987.

to a more ambitious effort aimed at imposing a cost high enough to cause Moscow to seek a negotiated withdrawal.

Reflecting these constraints and realities, the Reagan administration appears initially to have pursued a limited program of aid to the resistance which afforded a degree of Pakistani "deniability." Recently, however, the Administration appears to have been pushed by political pressures -- especially in the U.S. Congress -- towards a larger effort.

Pakistani policy. Pakistan's policy appears based on a desire to prevent or delay the consolidation of Soviet power in Afghanistan and to marshal world opinion against the occupation and in support of its own security. At the same time, Islamabad seeks to limit its identification with U.S. policy and keep open the option of a negotiated political settlement. This caution stems from a desire not to antagonize Moscow to the point of provoking major military retaliation, concern about protecting Pakistan's non-aligned and Islamic image, and worry about the long term impact of the Afghan refugees and the political consequences of domestic resentment of them.

Soviet capabilities. The Soviet Union faces a number of dilemmas in seeking to counter U.S. policy. Thus far, Moscow has failed to curb Pakistan's support for the Afghan resistance by a combination of inducements, such as the recently completed Karachi steel complex, and pressures, including a steady pattern of overflights, border shelling and sporadic, limited air attacks on Pakistani territory. Since the succession of Mikhail Gorbachev in March 1985, Soviet verbal pressure and border attacks have increased substantially.

The Soviet Union has a limited capability to exert direct military pressure on Pakistan. Minor border violations can be ignored by Pakistan. Major military incursions are impractical given current Soviet force levels, which are insufficient to avoid an embarrassing setback if opposed by the Pakistan

army and air force. Moreover, a large scale attack on Pakistan would reawaken Third World and Islamic concern about Soviet expansionism and risk a conflict with the United States. The Soviet Union might accept these risks, however, in the now unlikely event that it faced a military defeat in Afghanistan.

Moscow's ability to foment greater internal dissent in Pakistan also appears minimal at present. The practicality of any future Soviet effort to destabilize Pakistan could depend substantially on the results of President Zia-ul Haq's strategy to reintroduce limited representative government and lift martial law by stages, and on the performance of Pakistan's economy.

Policy options.

1) Provide carefully limited aid to the Afghan resistance. Even limited aid to the Afghan resistance would probably sustain a low level resistance movement in the Afghan countryside for a long time, although with dim prospect for preventing a Soviet consolidation. A limited U.S. effort would tend to minimize Soviet pressure on Pakistan and give the United States more freedom of action to pursue other policy goals such as deterring nuclear proliferation and reducing India-Pakistan tension. The dominant congressional perception, however, as expressed in congressional resolutions, statements and aid authorizations and appropriations, is that the United States is not doing enough to provide effective aid to the Afghan resistance.

2) Increase substantially the level of U.S. covert aid to the resistance, which according to press reports, totaled about \$280 million in FY 1985. Proponents of greater aid point to the obvious needs of the Afghan resistance and the requirement to counter a significant increase in Soviet military operations during the past year. Such an increase could include:

-- Providing more effective arms aid to the resistance. Proponents of such aid would provide American or other western portable ground-to-air missile and anti-tank rockets, among other items.

-- Providing overt aid to resistance-controlled areas of Afghanistan, including food, cash-for-food, and medical aid not being supplied under existing programs to alleviate hardship and counter Soviet efforts to depopulate the countryside and make resistance operations untenable. Recently passed legislation would authorize \$15 million in open "humanitarian" aid annually for these purposes for FY 86 and FY 87.

Variants of option 2 inevitably give more visibility to Pakistan's role as a conduit of arms, create a greater U.S. obligation to protect Pakistan from Soviet retaliation, and tend to make it more difficult to influence Pakistan's nuclear policy. Pakistan's willingness to cooperate in carrying them out, the response of the Soviet Union, and the effect on the Afghan conflict are matters of significant uncertainty.

Pakistan's Nuclear Activities

Pakistan apparently continues to place a high priority on efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons option. Its activities threaten regional stability and have created enough concern in Congress to put at risk the continuance of U.S. aid.

Congress has recently passed legislation that requires the President to certify, as a condition of U.S. aid, that Pakistan does not now have nuclear weapons and that U.S. aid will significantly reduce the risk that it will acquire them. The same legislation also includes a provision that would forbid aid to countries that violate U.S. laws concerning the export of nuclear related technology.

To limit Pakistan's nuclear activities, Congress could support one or more additional options:

1) Require, as a condition of U.S. aid, that the President give even stronger assurances regarding Pakistan's nuclear program, such as the assurance that Pakistan is not working to develop nuclear weapons. To date, the President has not been able to give such assurances. Thus, the success of this option would depend on Pakistan's valuing U.S. economic and security assistance more than having the ability to build nuclear weapons.

2) Make the sale of certain weapons systems contingent on Pakistani nuclear restraint. The purpose would not be to deny Pakistan needed arms, but to force it to choose between its nuclear program and the modernization of its armed forces. This approach also could precipitate a breakdown in U.S.-Pakistan security cooperation, but it is less confrontational and potentially more flexible than option 1.

3) Prod the Administration to undertake a more vigorous program of diplomacy aimed at getting both Pakistan and India to agree to forego nuclear weapons.

India-Pakistan Tension

Continued tension and suspicion between Pakistan and India constitute a serious obstacle to U.S. efforts to combat Soviet influence in the region, all the more so due to India's quasi-alliance relationship with the U.S.S.R. While some analysts regard the Indo-Soviet relationship itself as a problem for U.S. policy in the region, it is the Pakistan-India rivalry which most directly impinges on U.S. policy goals in Southwest Asia. A new India-Pakistan conflict would weaken Pakistan's ability to oppose Soviet policy in Afghanistan and present the United States with the dilemma of deciding whether to support Pakistan, the weaker power.

Options to reduce India-Pakistan tension are limited by the severe nature of the rivalry and consequences of the tacit strategic alignment between India and the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the United States, Pakistan and China, on the other. There may be some scope, however, for reducing Indian apprehensions about the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, without undercutting Pakistani confidence in the American commitment. Possible actions include:

- 1) Limit the kinds of arms the United States provides to Pakistan, more clearly tying U.S. provided weapons systems to the Afghanistan situation. Pakistan would likely reconsider its overall relationship with the United States, however, if it could not obtain the the kind of high technology weapons it most seeks from the U.S. security tie.

- 2) Seek to promote a partial repositioning of Pakistan's military forces, which are presently concentrated on the Indian border, as part of a comprehensive review to determine U.S. aid levels after the expiration of the current six-year program. This option would depend heavily on collateral confidence-building steps by both India and Pakistan, perhaps, as in the nuclear area, under the mantle of presently stalled normalization talks between the two.

- 3) Seek to reduce India-Pakistan tension by enhancing U.S.-India ties, an objective that partly lay behind a recently negotiated U.S.-Indian agreement on technology transfer.

THE UNITED STATES, PAKISTAN AND THE SOVIET THREAT
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INTRODUCTION

The following report examines options to deal with three problems concerning U.S.-Pakistan security ties that seem to most directly complicate the longer term efforts of the United States to contain the expansion of Soviet influence in South and Southwest Asia: 1) the "stalemated" military situation in Afghanistan, which may work to the advantage of the Soviet Union over the longer term; 2) Pakistan's apparent continued pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability in competition with India, which increases instability in the South Asia region and raises the possibility of a future legislatively mandated cutoff of U.S. aid; and 3) the inability of the United States thus far to moderate the rivalry between Pakistan and India, which has a growing nuclear component and which offers potential opportunities for exploitation by the Soviet Union at U.S. expense.

Congress influences U.S. policy by setting the levels and terms of U.S. economic and military assistance to Pakistan, authorizing and appropriating other funds related to the Afghanistan situation, and exercising oversight and legislative powers relating to arms sales and nuclear proliferation policy. The congressional role is especially important in view of impending negotiations on continued U.S. arms sales and military assistance to Pakistan after the completion of the current six-year aid program, and the necessity of specific

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legislative action to permit the continuance of U.S. aid after September 30, 1987, when the current six-year waiver to the application of the Symington amendment in Pakistan's case expires.

Evolution of U.S.-Pakistan Relations

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 heightened long-standing American concerns about Moscow's intentions towards southern Asia and the Persian Gulf. It thrust Pakistan, a strategically located South Asian country with whom the United States had a moribund bilateral security agreement, into the role of a "front line state." After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States and Pakistan moved quickly to repair their ties. The process of rapprochement culminated in a September 1981 agreement on a six-year, \$3.2 billion program of U.S. economic and military assistance to Pakistan.

U.S.-Pakistan relations had been deeply strained over an April 1979 cutoff of American aid that had been imposed by the Carter administration in response to Pakistan's acquisition of uranium enrichment technology that could help it to construct nuclear weapons. In November 1979 relations reached a low point when, in response to radio broadcasts from Iran falsely claiming American involvement in the takeover of the Great Mosque in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, anti-American mobs attacked and burned the U.S. Embassy and American cultural centers in Pakistan.

Compelling factors led to the revitalization of U.S.-Pakistan security ties. A poor, predominantly rural, South Asian country of more than ninety million people in an area half again the size of Texas, Pakistan found itself with over 80,000 Soviet troops within close proximity to its northern border and a swelling tide of Afghan refugees. The government headed by General Zia-ul Haq, which came to power in a July 1977 military coup, found in the Soviet invasion an opportunity to repair its ties with the United States, to

refurbish its military forces with modern American arms, and to increase significantly its influence in the Islamic world and in Persian Gulf security affairs.

The Carter administration, which had become concerned about the possibility of Soviet intervention in support of the beleaguered Afghan communist regime as early as the summer of 1979, saw Pakistan as the logical focus of the U.S. response in Southwest Asia. As a result of the Iranian revolution and the ongoing hostage crisis in Tehran, Pakistan was the only place where the United States could demonstrate concretely its determination to oppose Soviet expansionism and the only avenue for providing support to the Afghan resistance movement. Pakistan's status as an emerging leader of the Non-aligned Movement and chairman of the Organization of the Islamic Conference also made it an obvious partner in the American effort to rally Third World opinion against the Soviet invasion.

During the past five and one-half years, the U.S.-Pakistan security relationship has deepened steadily. U.S. aid averaging more than \$600 million per year has materially improved the fighting capability of Pakistan's defense forces, contributed to the country's economic growth and helped bridge a major hard currency deficit. The United States has also played a significant role in promoting badly needed credits from the International Monetary Fund and development loans from the World Bank.

Achievements and Problems of U.S. Policy Towards Pakistan

Achievements

Most analysts would rate the achievement of the current U.S.-Pakistan relationship as a qualified foreign policy success. Since December 1979 Pakistan has maintained a strong stance against the Soviet occupation of

Afghanistan despite considerable verbal pressure from Moscow and frequent shelling and air attacks across the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier. Backed by the United States, China and conservative Persian Gulf countries, Pakistan has played a key role in providing a haven for the Afghan refugees and a channel for aid to the Afghan resistance.

With the assistance of supplies flowing across the Pakistan border, the Afghan resistance has succeeded in preventing the early consolidation of Soviet control. For over five years, the Afghan "mujahidin" ("warriors for the faith"), many of whom took up arms as early as the Communist coup of April 1978, have denied control over the countryside to Soviet and Afghan government forces, kept the Soviet-installed Karmal regime politically isolated, and limited Afghanistan's utility as a base for potential Soviet military operations in the oil-rich Persian Gulf region.

Problem Areas in U.S.-Pakistan Relations

Despite the achievement of a cooperative and productive relationship with Pakistan, the longer term prospects for impeding Soviet expansionism in South Asia are endangered by conflicting U.S. and Pakistani perspectives and prevailing conditions in South Asia. For instance, Pakistan appears to attach more importance to building up its own military forces than providing arms to the Afghan resistance, whereas the United States apparently places high value on the latter. Pakistan appears to regard the acquisition of a nuclear weapons option as a major adjunct to its security rather than as a destabilizing factor in the South and Southwest Asia balance. Finally, it appears to view India rather than the Soviet Union as the most credible threat to its security. These differences in perspective tend to make it more difficult for the United States to achieve its own regional security

objectives through cooperation with Pakistan, and tend to raise the price for the United States of any progress that is achieved.

The Potential Problem of Political Instability in Pakistan

In addition to these conflicting perspectives, future political turmoil in Pakistan could also threaten the achievement of U.S. objectives. Pakistan's social and political order has remained comparatively calm in recent years, with the exception of a major outbreak of anti-government agitation in Sind Province in 1983, and periodic sectarian and ethnic violence. Nonetheless, the country remains politically unstable in the judgment of many analysts.

Sources of instability in Pakistan include not only the dissatisfaction of the traditional political parties with the continued dominance of the military, but also Sunni-Shi'a sectarian conflicts arising out of the Zia government's policy of "Islamization," an unequal distribution of political and economic power among the four main ethnic groups, and other tensions associated with the process of modernization in a poor, educationally backward, developing country. 3/

Many American and Pakistani analysts regard the country as more stable in the the aftermath of the February 1985 elections, which reestablished elected national and provincial assemblies after a seven-year hiatus. But

3/ The current economic downturn could also produce turmoil that would endanger U.S.-Pakistan ties. Generally, analysts have counted Pakistan's favorable growth rate, averaging about 5-6 percent over the past five years, as a major contributor to stability, and have viewed an adverse economic situation as posing the greatest danger to the Zia government. With exports currently running at 12 percent less than last year, remittances from Pakistanis working abroad falling by 14 percent, and wheat production falling by 15-20 percent, the pressures on Pakistan's finances are growing sharply. (Service on Pakistan's rapidly rising foreign debt now totals \$ 1 billion annually, roughly one half of export earnings -- which are themselves only one half of imports). Defense expenditures and debt service now account for 74 percent of the country's internal revenue. Far Eastern Economic Review. May 9, 1985. p. 80-81.

martial law remains in place and the present political structure falls short of the aspirations of even moderate critics of the regime. Falling personal income and government resource constraints could provide a rallying point for the outlawed opposition parties, which are currently smarting from having failed to persuade the public to boycott the national and provincial assembly elections. Any successor government that came to power as a result of a political upheaval would likely be less interested in security cooperation with the United States, and possibly even hostile to U.S. objectives.

U.S. Policy Constraints

At present, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship remains determined mainly by U.S. global policy towards the Soviet Union. Although a minority of American foreign policy specialists have argued for a substantially different policy towards the Soviet Union and the Afghanistan issue, ^{4/} the dominant perspective favors active opposition to the expansion of Soviet influence and military power. So long as the broader pattern of U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf prevails, derivative U.S. policy options towards Pakistan will be substantially constrained.

In addition to being limited by larger requirements of U.S. strategy towards the Soviet Union, U.S. policy choices are also complicated by

^{4/} Including, among others, George Kennan and Selig Harrison. Kennan argued in congressional testimony that the best course was to seek to alleviate tension surrounding the Afghanistan situation in the hope of a gradual Soviet withdrawal, and that American ultimata, military alignment with China or support of the Afghan resistance would be counterproductive. Statement of Hon. George F. Kennan, Former Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., Princeton, N.J., February 27, 1980. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and its Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, on U.S. Security Requirements in the Near East and South Asia. February 6, 7, 20, 27; March 4, 18, 1980. Nineth-Sixth Congress, Second Session. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1980. p. 88-91.

inevitable conflicts among U.S. goals. For instance, there would appear to be a basic conflict between seeking to achieve tighter constraints on Pakistan's nuclear activities while at the same time gaining greater Pakistani cooperation in aiding the Afghan resistance. Similarly, a more ambitious effort at supporting the Afghan resistance which required additional U.S. military technology be sent to Pakistan would likely be incompatible with a greater U.S. emphasis on reducing India-Pakistan tension.

Within these parameters, the following report discusses alternative strategies concerning Pakistan for pursuing broad U.S. policy objectives and relates these policy options to specific opportunities for Congress to exercise its influence. The report assumes that Pakistan's internal politics will be only marginally susceptible to U.S. influence and it addresses the issue of political instability in Pakistan only as a background to the discussion of U.S. options concerning the problem areas noted above. Policy options discussed in the report are limited to those bearing on U.S.-Pakistan relations.

Southwest Asia



CURRENT U.S. POLICY TOWARDS PAKISTAN

U.S. policy towards Pakistan is designed to help protect broader U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf-Southwest Asia region from both Soviet expansion and indigenous developments that could be exploited by the U.S.S.R. In fulfillment of this objective, the United States entered into a six-year program of military and economic assistance aimed at enhancing Pakistan's security and internal stability, strengthening its resistance to Soviet pressure and influence, and informally involving it in the defense of the Persian Gulf region. The policy's roots are in the Carter administration's response both to the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Although the resources committed by the Reagan administration have been much greater, basic policy still derives from President Carter's State of the Union address of January 23, 1980, in which he declared that the United States would use military force if necessary to defend the Persian Gulf from attack by "any outside force," and the U.S. desire to actively impede a Soviet consolidation in Afghanistan. 5/

The policy has passed through several phases, as American and Pakistani leaders have come to understand better each other's objectives and to adjust their own goals accordingly. For instance, the Reagan administration apparently has shelved as impractical its earlier reported goal of incorporating Pakistan into a "strategic consensus" encompassing an arc of countries from Pakistan through Turkey, and has not sought to acquire military bases in the country.

5/ President Jimmy Carter, State of the Union Address, January 23, 1980. (text in The New York Times, January 24, 1980. p. A12)

Pakistan's arms acquisitions appear to be determined by its own perceived requirements rather than any joint U.S.-Pakistan defense cooperation objectives, and the country has jealously guarded its non-aligned and Islamic credentials.

Partly as a consequence of this limited relationship, Pakistan has had to settle for a less categorical commitment to its security than it initially sought. The United States reiterated the validity of the 1959 bilateral security agreement, but did not upgrade it to the status of the treaty as the Zia government originally desired. 6/

While holding similar broad goals, the Carter and Reagan administrations differed in the amount of resources they were prepared to expend and, apparently, in their priorities. President Zia dismissed as "peanuts" an offer of \$400 million in economic and security assistance made by the Carter administration in early 1980. The Reagan administration, however, was prepared to make a long term commitment involving substantial resources and the sale of sophisticated military hardware. Annual U.S. aid to Pakistan is shown in the appendix. At present, total U.S. resources committed to Pakistan and the Afghanistan situation may approach \$1 billion annually. 7/

The Reagan administration's policy is characterized by a predominant concern to maintain Pakistan's cooperation in U.S. efforts to oppose Soviet expansion and the consolidation of Soviet and Afghan Communist control over

6/ The agreement is identical to those signed with Iran and Turkey in the context of the previous Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) alliance, to which the United States was an observer but not a member, and the 1957 congressional Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Security in the Middle East, which addresses the threat of Communist aggression. The agreement binds the United States only to consult with Pakistan in the event of aggression and, in accordance with U.S. constitutional procedures and as envisioned in the 1957 Resolution, to take such action, including the use of force, as may be mutually agreed upon.

7/ This includes approximately \$650 million in annual direct assistance to Pakistan, about \$70 million in support of Afghan refugee programs, and reportedly, \$250-280 million in covert aid to Afghan resistance groups.

Afghanistan. While the administration has sought to constrain Islamabad's nuclear program and has apparently made known in forceful terms its opposition to a Pakistani bomb, it has also vigorously sought to forestall any congressional non-proliferation measures that would put in jeopardy U.S.-Pakistan security cooperation. Similarly, while the Administration appears to be well aware of the negative consequences for U.S. objectives of India-Pakistan tension, and has sought better relations with India, it is not inclined to take any steps towards either country that might reduce Pakistan's willingness to cooperate with U.S. policy.

PAKISTAN AND THE AFGHANISTAN "STALEMATE"

Background and AnalysisStatus of the Afghan Conflict

As of mid-1985 the Soviets have yet to consolidate their hold on the country or create a viable Communist regime. The tenaciousness of the Afghan resistance, which Moscow apparently underestimated, has limited Soviet control to Kabul and a few larger towns, and the main highway linking the capital with the Soviet frontier. At the same time, the Soviets have made gains. They have expanded their military infrastructure, steadily increased their domination of the Afghan security services and civilian bureaucracy, begun to train a new generation in Soviet institutions and Soviet-curriculum Afghan schools, and further tied Afghanistan to the Soviet economy. It remains an open question whether the Soviets ultimately will succeed in consolidating their position in Afghanistan and thus will be able to project greater military power towards the Persian Gulf.

The cost of opposing Soviet power has been high, both for the Afghan people and for the resistance itself. Some 4 million or more people -- up to one-third of the pre-invasion population -- have fled to Pakistan, Iran and other countries. Of those who remain, some 1-2 million are internal refugees in Kabul and other relatively combat-free population centers. Hundreds of thousands have been killed or maimed. As the resistance has grown in effectiveness, so has the devastation inflicted by Soviet air attacks on Afghan villages and farms.

U.S. Policy: Uncertain Objectives

More than five years after the Soviet invasion there is still no consensus about what the U.S. goals should be. Few are persuaded that the Soviets are seriously interested in a withdrawal under present circumstances, while even fewer believe that the resistance can drive the Soviets from the field militarily under any currently foreseeable levels of aid or resistance unity. Thus, while the United States reportedly has been involved in providing arms and supplies to the resistance since early 1980, the objectives of the U.S. effort remain uncertain other than to support the nationalist resistance and raise the price of Soviet military adventure. Some policy makers apparently prefer a limited program aimed at delaying the consolidation of a Soviet strategic advantage while not overly exposing Pakistan to Soviet pressure or military retaliation. Others within the U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy and many Members of Congress have advocated a more ambitious effort, arguing that with more effective aid the resistance can exact a high enough price to cause the Soviets to seek a negotiated withdrawal. ^{8/} Many also support higher aid levels on ideological and moral grounds regardless of the prospects.

Reflecting these constraints and realities, the Reagan administration appears to have pursued a limited program of aid to the resistance. This program appears to have been pushed repeatedly by political pressures in the U.S. Congress and elsewhere into a more ambitious effort. U.S. aid to the resistance is reported to have grown rapidly since the summer of 1984, largely

^{8/} This view was recently articulated in private writing by a Department of Defense Official who argued that "the Soviets would be hard put to respond to a more effective resistance with any meaningful shift in strategy," either by increasing their forces or putting more pressure on Pakistan. Krakowski, Elie D. "Afghanistan: The Forgotten War." Strategic Studies (Islamabad). Vol. VIII, No. 3. Spring 1985. p. 33-46.

in response to congressional prodding. 9/ At the same time, the resistance groups have renewed their own efforts to achieve greater political unity and battlefield cooperation. 10/ Whether these changes can make a material difference in the outcome of the Afghan struggle remains to be seen, although the resistance seems to have stood up well against a significant increase in Soviet military pressure during the past year.

Pakistan's Role in the Afghanistan Situation

Pakistan has played an indispensable role in providing a home for 2.5 million or more refugees and secure base areas for the resistance fighters. 11/ At the same time, however, Pakistan is perceived by many as an obstacle to providing more effective arms to the resistance, especially anti-aircraft weapons, 12/ and is seen as potentially vulnerable to Soviet pressure to abandon its role as a safe haven and a conduit for external aid.

9/ Gelb, Leslie H. U.S. Aides Put '85 Arms Supplies to Afghan Rebels at \$280 million. New York Times, November 28, 1984. p. 1. Woodward, Bob and Charles R. Babcock. U.S. Covert Aid to Afghans on Rise. Washington Post, January 13, 1985. p. A1, 30.

10/ In May 1985, reportedly under pressure from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United States, seven of the main resistance factions, including four "fundamentalists" and three "moderate" groups, forged a new coalition directed by a supreme council of the constituent groups' leaders. Reportedly, cooperation has improved on the battlefield but significant political divisions and personal rivalries remain. FBIS. Daily Report. South Asia. Mar. 29, 1985. p. c4; The Washington Post. September 4, 1985. p. A28.

11/ If the Vietnam analogy has any relevance to the Afghan war, it is in reiterating the critical importance of access by guerrilla forces to refuge and supplies outside the conflict area, such as the Viet Cong guerrillas and the North Vietnamese army enjoyed in Cambodia and Laos, and the Afghan mujahidin now enjoy in Pakistan. For a discussion of the role of sanctuaries and external assistance in the success of guerrilla movements, including the Vietnam case, see Niksch, Larry A. Case Studies of Counter-Insurgencies. CRS Report No. 85-60 F. March 12, 1985.

12/ Felton, John. Budget Item Opens a Window on Afghan War. Congression Quarterly. August 4, 1984, p. 1903-1906.

Basis for Pakistan's policy. Pakistan's "principled stand" on the Afghanistan issue has been formulated in terms of four points: the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan; the restoration of the independent and non-aligned status of Afghanistan; restoration of the right of the Afghan people to form a government of their own choice; and the creation of conditions conducive to the return of the refugees to their homes with honor and dignity. These points are similar to United Nations and Organization of the Islamic Conference resolutions, which Pakistan helped draft. The Pakistan government has also declared that it will not recognize the Karmal regime until Soviet troops are withdrawn. 13/

Almost since the invasion itself, Pakistan has conducted a multi-faceted policy to mobilize world opinion against the action and insure its own security. It has welcomed the Afghan refugees and administered, with the support of international relief agencies and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, a relief program that has been widely praised for its efficiency and effectiveness. In addition, Pakistan has reportedly cooperated in efforts by the United States, China, Saudi Arabia and other countries to provide material aid to the Afghan resistance. 14/

While Pakistan does not wish to see the Soviets achieve their goals, it remains uncomfortable about appearing to be too closely linked with U.S. policy. Pakistanis from all levels of society feel deeply suspicious of U.S. commitments as a result of the unwillingness of the United States to support

13/ FBIS, Daily Reprot, South Asia. March 14, 1984. p. F1.; Ibid. July 10, 1985. P F1.

14/ According to some reports, this cooperation began in early 1980, more than a year before agreement was reached on the multi-year U.S. aid package for Pakistan. Middleton, Drew. Aides Disagree on Level of U.S. Arms to Aid Afghans. New York Times. July 21, 1980. p. A3; Bernstein, Carl. Arms for Afghanistan. The New Republic. July 18, 1981. p. 8-10; U.S. Aiding Afghan Foes, Sadat Says. Baltimore Sun. September 23, 1981.

it in its 1965 war with India and the failure of U.S. policy to prevent the loss of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war. Pakistan's reticence also stems from concern about possible increased Soviet attacks and other pressure, and its desire to preserve its image as a non-aligned Islamic country. This image is important both for domestic political reasons and to counter Indian influence in the Non-aligned Movement and the United Nations -- for instance, to enlist Third World support for its positions in disputes with India.

Judging from press comment, neither the refugees nor Islamabad's policy on Afghanistan are popular in Pakistan. Although the refugees have been generally well received in the Northwest Frontier Province, where most of them are settled and have ethnic ties, they are resented in Baluchistan, Punjab and Sind Provinces. While few Pakistanis openly favor capitulating to Soviet pressure, ethnic antagonism towards the largely Pushtu-speaking refugees and discontent with the martial law regime have fueled public criticism. Many Pakistanis see the country's security relationship with the United States as an obstacle to a settlement that would permit the refugees to return home. 15/

Islamabad has other reasons for a cautious policy towards aiding the resistance. Historically, the Afghan Pushtun groups, with the backing of previous Afghan governments, have agitated for a greater "Pushtunistan" that would unite both the Afghan and Pakistani Pushtu-speaking regions.

15/ In May 1985 the minister of state for foreign affairs apparently felt compelled to tell the new assembly that Pakistan's policy was not dictated by America. The only real debate which developed, however, was a thirty minute session in June in response to violations of Pakistan's border from Afghanistan. In that session, the Foreign Minister, Sahabzada Yakub Khan, assured the assembly that Pakistan could defend itself and that it could not be coerced into recognizing the Karmal regime. Rather than weakening its stance through coercion, he said the government would reconsider its own policy of restraint. He also noted that if Pakistan's moral and material resources alone were not sufficient for its defense, it was "not without without friends," especially the Islamic community. The Muslim (Islamabad), May 29, 1985. p. 1; Ibid. June 13, 1985. p. 1, 8.

Although the refugees are now supportive of and dependent on the Zia government, some Pakistani officials reportedly have been nervous about the influx of weapons to the resistance groups, and seek both to limit the arms flows and control or influence the resistance through informal channels such as the pro-government Jamaat-i-Islami fundamentalist party. 16/

Pakistan has also kept alive the possibility of a political settlement within the framework of the UN sponsored indirect negotiations at Geneva. Few analysts see any possibility of the talks bearing fruit under currently foreseeable circumstances, but it appears to serve Pakistan's goals to keep the talks going. They provide some protection against more serious Soviet military pressure, and they allow the government to reassure the public that something is being done to promote the eventual return of the refugees. 17/

Soviet Policy Towards Pakistan

The Soviet Union has attempted to curb Pakistan's support for the Afghan resistance by means of a two-track policy. On the one hand, the Soviets have courted Pakistan with inducements such as the massive Karachi steel complex, which was recently dedicated amidst professions of Soviet-Pakistani friendship. On the other hand, the Soviets and their Afghan allies have kept up a steady pattern of cross border reconnaissance overflights and sporadic, limited air

16/ Fullerton, John. A Rift Among the Rebels. Far Eastern Economic Review, October 29, 1982. p. 20, 22; Viratelle, Gerard. Afghan Resistance Looking Towards Peace Moves. Manchester Guardian Weekly, December 19, 1982. p. 12.

17/ Pakistan's interest in keeping the talks going was evident when, following the completion of the fourth round in late June 1985, Pakistani foreign minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan reportedly said that Pakistan would continue the talks on non-interference (the Soviet code-word for its goal of stopping external aid to the resistance), the return of the refugees and international guarantees of a political settlement, "even if the withdrawal of Soviet troops is not discussed." (Emphasis added) FBIS. Daily Report. South Asia. July 3, 1985. p. F1.

attacks on resistance camps and villages on the Pakistani side of the border. While many of these incidents could be reasonably linked to fighting in nearby parts of Afghanistan, others are almost certainly deliberate signals to Pakistan

Soviet threats appeared to reach a higher pitch during President Zia's attendance at Chernenko's funeral in March 1985, when the new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and Foreign Minister (now Chairman of the Supreme Soviet) Andrei Gromyko reportedly warned Zia and Pakistan's foreign minister, Sahabzada Yaqub Kahn, in extremely blunt terms about Pakistan's role in the Afghanistan situation. 18/

The Soviets also took a very hard line following press reports that 12 Soviet and 12 Afghan soldiers, who had been captured by the Afghan Jamaat-e-Islami resistance group, were killed after they had succeeded in taking over a building in a prison camp near Peshawar where they were being held. Moscow's Tass news service labeled the alleged incident a "heinous crime" and charged the Pakistani governor of the Northwest Frontier Province, Lt. Gen. Fazle Haq, with seeking to cover up the incident. According to the Tass story, the Soviet Ambassador demanded that those involved be punished and stated that the Soviet Union expects Pakistan "will draw the proper conclusions about the consequences with which its complicity in the aggression against the DRA and its actions against the Soviet Union is fraught." 19/

A more authoritative article in Izvestia by Aleksandr Bovin on May 17 attacked Pakistan in only slightly less blunt terms. Bovin, a senior commentator on foreign affairs, accused Islamabad of duplicity in professing a desire for a negotiated settlement of the Afghanistan question, charged it

18/ FBIS Wire Service, May 14, 1985.

19/ Doder, Dusko. Gorbachev warns on Afghan aid; link between Pakistan and U.S. pressure on Nicaragua hinted. Washington Post, March 16, 1985. p. A1, A28.

with "direct responsibility" for the death of the Soviet soldiers, and warned that its policies did not serve "the genuine national interests of the country, especially in the long term." 20/

Despite these threats, the Soviets went ahead with the fourth round of the UN-sponsored indirect negotiations in Geneva in late June and a fifth round in August. There is still no indication of a fundamental change in policy towards Pakistan, which includes a remarkably high degree of tolerance for actions that thwart Soviet objectives. Either the Soviets feel that their policy will ultimately prevail despite Pakistan's role, or they find their options sufficiently constrained to deter a harsher response.

Extent of Soviet Leverage

Soviet military options. The Soviet Union faces serious impediments in trying to exert direct military pressure on Pakistan. The recent minor border violations provide a Soviet warning against Pakistan's adopting a stance more supportive of the resistance, but thus far the attacks have inflicted little damage and few casualties. To a large extent they can be ignored by Pakistan, unless it chooses to highlight them for domestic or foreign policy objectives. When reported in Pakistan, they tend to create contradictory feelings of concern, on the one hand, that the country's position is too exposed, and nationalistic reactions, on the other, against the Soviet Union and the Karmal regime.

More serious military incursions into Pakistan that would seek to eliminate refugee sanctuaries or seize border territory are within Soviet capabilities, but these too would have considerable risks and would raise again exactly the kind of aggressive image that the Soviet leaders currently seek to dispel.

20/ FBIS Wire Service, May 17, 1985.

Such attacks would refocus world attention on Moscow's actions in Afghanistan and create renewed concern about Soviet aggression among Pakistan's Islamic allies and many Third World countries, at a minimum. If seriously opposed by the 450,000 man Pakistan army, including two tank divisions, and an air force which includes more than 250 combat aircraft (including 18 F-16 fighter bombers), the ground forces currently available to the Soviet Afghanistan command would be insufficient and could suffer an embarrassing military setback. Moreover, any deep penetration would risk a direct U.S. military intervention in support of Pakistan.

Notwithstanding these restraints on Soviet action, Pakistan does occupy a vulnerable position. It is open to question whether the Pakistan Air Force, which has yet to bring down an aircraft violating its Afghan border in five years, would actually tangle with the Soviet army and air force, or whether Pakistan could redeploy enough ground forces from the Indian frontier in time to counter a Soviet thrust. It is notable in this respect that Pakistan has not redeployed major ground forces to deter or block a Soviet incursion. 21/

Influence on Pakistan's internal stability. The Soviets could also try to foment greater internal dissent in Pakistan, although the degree of Soviet influence with dissident groups in Pakistan, such as the Baluch minority and radical leftist political groups, appears minimal at present. Earlier concerns that the Soviet Union might exploit Baluch dissidence to dismember Pakistan and acquire a position on the Arabian Sea were not vindicated by subsequent events. The Zia government has paid more attention to the Baluch

21/ On the contrary, at a congressional hearing in February 1985 a U.S. Defense Department official stated that Pakistan had one more army division opposite the Indian frontier and one less in the West than in 1980. Prepared statement of Major General Kenneth D. Burns, USAF, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, February 28, 1985. p. 8.

minority, while Moscow's image as a potential outside patron was heavily tarnished by its Afghanistan adventure. Still, the U.S.S.R. could promote more open dissidence in Baluchistan or Sind provinces by encouraging radical leftist elements among the opposition parties to take to the streets. It could also encourage a new campaign of terrorism by avowedly revolutionary groups such as Al Zulfikar ("The Sword"), an extremist group headed by Murtaza Bhutto, son of the late Pakistani Prime Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (who was executed by the Zia government in 1979 for allegedly having ordered the murder of a political opponent.) 22/

These options are only marginally feasible, however, without major changes in the current political situation. The practicality of any future Soviet effort to destabilize Pakistan could depend substantially on the results of Zia's strategy to reintroduce limited representative government and lift martial law by stages, and on the performance of the Pakistan economy.

U.S. Policy Options

U.S. options relate to the degree to which the United States should oppose Soviet policy in Afghanistan, and the form that such opposition should take.

Provide Carefully Limited Aid to the Afghan Resistance

To a certain extent, broad U.S. policy objectives might be met by only a limited program of aid to the Afghan resistance, such as was reportedly in place during the Carter and early Reagan administrations. Some arguments in favor of a carefully limited program include:

-- The provision of low technology small arms, including Soviet-bloc weapons and arms from the commercial market, is compatible with the small

22/ Until his still unexplained death in Paris in August 1985, another son, Shahnawaz Bhutto, shared the leadership of Al Zulfikar. Among other acts, members of Al Zulfikar hijacked an airliner to Kabal in March 1981.

scale, irregular nature of Afghan resistance forces and their low level of education and training.

-- A small scale effort gives Pakistan more "deniability" and minimizes both Soviet pressure and domestic political criticism in Pakistan.

-- A limited program of aid may correspond better to Pakistan's own policy goals and may thereby minimize the policy cost to be paid by the United States for gaining Pakistan's cooperation.

Some specialists have also argued that the United States should focus its efforts on promoting a negotiated settlement rather than adopting a confrontational policy. One long time observer of South Asian politics, for instance, has argued that stronger U.S. support of the U.N.-sponsored negotiations could lead to an agreement by Moscow not to build "strategic bases" in Afghanistan, and that this is the best that the United States can hope for. 23/

While many Members of Congress would agree that the United States should not allow the Afghanistan issue to get in the way of other important aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations, such as strategic arms negotiations, and many have called for a political solution to the Afghanistan problem, few, if any, have supported recognizing the Soviet occupation as a fait accompli. In fact, the dominant congressional perception seemed in mid-1985 to be that the United States is not doing enough to provide effective aid to the mujahidin, who have almost universal American public sympathy.

23/ Harrison, Selig S. A breakthrough in Afghanistan? Foreign Policy, no. 51, Summer 1983. p. 8-9, 24 and; The United States and South Asia, in William A. Buckingham, Jr. (ed.), Defense Planning in the 1990s. Washington, National Defense University Press, 1984. p. 281, 291-292.

Increase U.S. Aid to the Afghan Resistance

Another option is to increase further the amount of U.S. aid, which allegedly has increased every year since 1980, and reportedly totals about \$250-280 million for FY 1985, in the biggest CIA covert aid program since the Vietnam War. According to press reports, the resistance also receives another \$100-200 million a year from Middle Eastern countries and China. 24/

Proponents of increased U.S. aid point to the continuing deficiencies in arms, supplies and medical care and the need to counter a significant increase in Soviet military pressure during the past year. While some of these needs might be met from non-U.S. sources or through aid given openly (see below), practical considerations suggest that the vast bulk of the mujahidin's requirements would have to be met through covert means. Without more aid, it is argued, the resistance eventually will be worn down, just as the Soviets appear to be calculating. With additional resources, on the other hand, the resistance may eventually become sufficiently strong and unified so as to give the Soviets an incentive to seek a settlement on terms favorable to Afghan and western interests.

Provide more effective weapons. European and American press accounts suggest that the resistance has been receiving a range of weapons, including Soviet type assault rifles, mortars, 12.7 heavy machine guns, RPG-7 anti-tank rockets, land mines, and even a few (and reportedly ineffective) SAM-7 anti-aircraft rockets. 25/ One of the main complaints of resistance spokesmen and their supporters in the Congress is that the guerrillas are not being supplied

24/ New York Times. November 28, 1984. p. A1,9; Washington Post, January 13, 1985. p. A1,30; The Economist, January 19, 1985. p. 23-24.

25/ Giradet, Edward. Arming the Afghan Guerrillas: Perils, Secrecy. Christian Science Monitor, November 20, 1984. p. 15, 16.

with weapons that are effective against the Soviet helicopter threat. In particular, many would like to supply U.S. or western arms such as the U.S. Army's Redeye shoulder-fired ground-to-air missile. Press reports suggest, however, that the Administration has deflected these demands on grounds that some deniability should be preserved and that in the main the resistance should be given Soviet bloc weapons. The reports also suggest that Pakistan objects strongly to providing these and other sophisticated arms, both because they could be turned against Pakistani forces under other circumstances and because they would invite Soviet retaliation. 26/

Despite these constraints, the resistance groups have apparently shown some ingenuity in employing the arms they do have. For instance, the Afghan resistance reportedly has made very effective use of remotely detonated mines, thus protecting the attackers from aerial retaliation. More effective weapons would, however, seem to be a basic element of a more effective resistance.

Provide overt aid. Recently, support has grown for supplementing covert aid with open assistance across the Afghan border, including food assistance, cash for food, and medical training and supplies. Proponents argue that these are not being provided or are not being provided in sufficient quantity through other sources. One goal is to relieve shortages of food and medical care within Afghanistan in order to keep the remaining population in place and prevent an even larger refugee flow. This would benefit the resistance, as it would tend to counter Soviet efforts to depopulate the countryside and deny the guerrilla fighters access to supplies and cover provided by a friendly population. Some who argue for a more visible U.S. aid program also seek greater certainty that needs are being met and greater visibility for U.S. support of the Afghan cause.

The provision of overt aid partly follows the logic of S. Con. Res. 74, passed by Congress in October 1984, which states that it should be the policy of the United States "to support effectively the people of Afghanistan in their fight for freedom." As evidence of broad support, the resolution passed the Senate by a vote of 97-3 and by unanimous consent in the House.

Reportedly under pressure from Congressman Charles Wilson, Senator Gordon Humphrey and others, the Reagan administration reprogrammed \$2 million FY 1985 refugee relief funds and provided it to the International Red Cross for dispersal. Another \$2 million was reprogrammed from other accounts into a "Cash for Food" program aimed at helping relieve a food shortage inside Afghanistan. Finally, \$4 million in unexpended aid funds for Syria has also been earmarked for transfer to the direct aid program. 27/

Congress has recently supported a more ambitious program of direct humanitarian aid. The recently passed FY 1986 foreign assistance authorization act (PL 99-83) authorizes not less than \$15 million in economic support funds for "humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people" both in FY 86 and FY 87. The House Appropriations Committee has recommended \$15 million in development assistance and economic support funds for these purposes in the FY 1986 foreign assistance appropriations bill (H.R. 3228, H. Rept. 99-252, p. 65-66), including no less than \$2 million for the International Medical Corps for operations inside Afghanistan.

Gaining Pakistan's Cooperation: Policy Tradeoffs

The potential drawbacks to increasing the quantity and quality of U.S. aid to the Afghan resistance include the practicalities of absorbing large increases without excessive wastage, the presumed ability of the Soviets to compensate

27/ New York Times, May 9, 1985. p. A9; Washington Post, May 10, 1985. p. A20.

with more troops and firepower, and, potentially most important, the problem of gaining Pakistani cooperation.

Press reports on Pakistan's attitude suggest that the congressional initiatives would be welcome, if at all, only if accompanied by additional compensating benefits to Pakistan. These could take the form of higher aid levels, more sophisticated arms or greater forbearance of Pakistan's nuclear activities.

The prospects for a major increase in the dollar value of U.S. aid to Pakistan would appear doubtful. First, Pakistan is already the fourth largest recipient of U.S. assistance after Israel, Egypt and Turkey. It can take satisfaction that the previously agreed upon levels of aid have been maintained in the present climate of constrained U.S. budgets. Second, with a rapidly rising debt and adverse economic circumstances, Pakistan's ability to repay even concessional aid will become increasingly questionable.

Greater cooperation might be attained by providing weapons designed to reduce Pakistan's vulnerability to Soviet military pressure. These could include additional F-16 or other fighter aircraft after the end of the present six-year aid package, an airborne warning and control system such as the EC-2 Hawkeye, which Pakistan reportedly has considered requesting, and other weapons systems designed to strengthen Pakistan's border defenses.

In July 1985 it was reported that, in response to an increase in cross border attacks on Pakistan, the United States would expedite the shipment of AIM-9L Sidewinder air-to-air missiles and provide shoulder-launched Stinger ground-to-air missiles. The advanced Sidewinder missiles have the capability of being fired at an approaching aircraft rather than having to lock on to its exhaust signature from the rear, as in the older model Sidewinders Pakistan now

deploys, thus allowing a quicker reaction time against aircraft crossing its borders. 28/

Nonetheless, additional arms alone will neither guarantee Pakistan's security nor assure its support of U.S. objectives. Given the potential threat it faces from the Soviet Union, any level of U.S. military aid must be primarily symbolic -- evidence of the seriousness of the American commitment to support Pakistan's security. U.S. provided arms cannot make any appreciable difference in the overall balance of forces across the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier, though both the quantum of American supplied weapons and specific systems may raise the level of deterrence. Ultimately, Pakistan's best protection against Soviet aggression lies in its internal political stability and the support for its integrity by neighbors and external allies, notably including the United States and China. Importantly, this implies the normalization of relations with India -- the subject of the last chapter.

Perhaps the most important cost for increased Pakistani cooperation in aid to the Afghan resistance is the narrowing of U.S. options for responding to Islamabad's nuclear activities. The threat of drastic action, such as an aid cutoff in response to a nuclear explosion, tends to decline with growing U.S. dependence on Pakistan's cooperation on the Afghanistan issue. The ways in which the United States might seek to manage this dilemma are explored next.

28/ Gwertzman, Bernard. U.S. Rushing Missiles to Pakistan; Cites Air Raids from Afghanistan. New York Times, July 12, 1985. p. A1,2.

PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES

Nuclear competition has long been a part of the India-Pakistan rivalry, even though Pakistan's financial, material and scientific resources are significantly less than India's. As early as 1965 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then foreign minister and de facto chief of Pakistan's nuclear program, reportedly declared: "If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry" in order to compete. ^{29/} After India's 1974 blast Pakistan accelerated its effort to acquire a nuclear option. Since the late 1970's Pakistan apparently has concentrated on uranium enrichment as its main route to a bomb capability (as opposed to India, which used plutonium from a research reactor for its fissionable material.)

Pakistanis strongly resent efforts by the United States and other countries to limit their nuclear option, even as Pakistan's leaders disavow any intention of developing a bomb. U.S. and other countries' concerns are grounded in a belief that by trying to match India's capability, Pakistan is forcing the pace of proliferation in South Asia. While India did not produce nuclear weapons after demonstrating its ability to do so in 1974, many analysts feel that in the long run, a nuclear armed India is likely and that the reaction starting with Pakistan's efforts will make proliferation come sooner rather than later to South Asia. During mid-1985 Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi declared that India was reconsidering its previous commitment not to build nuclear weapons. As if to put teeth behind the implied threat, India in

^{29/} Weissman, Steve, and Krosney, Herbert. The Islamic Bomb: the Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East. New York: Times Books, 1981. p. 161.

August 1985 started up a new research reactor named Dhruva ("Pole Star") (formerly designated R-5) that, although built for civil use could, in theory, provide enough plutonium for several bombs a year. 30/

Background and Analysis

U.S. Policy Towards Pakistan's Nuclear Activities

Between 1976 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States adopted sometimes forceful measures to deal with Pakistan's nuclear activities without regard to their impact on U.S.-Pakistan security relationship. These included the refusal to sell Pakistan 110 U.S. A-7 light attack aircraft, the suspension of U.S. aid to Pakistan in 1978 on account of its effort to acquire a French supplied nuclear reprocessing facility, and successful pressure on France to cancel that contract. In April 1979, after obtaining evidence that Pakistan was secretly building a centrifuge-type uranium enrichment facility that could be used to produce fissionable material, the Carter administration invoked Section 669 (Symington amendment) of the Foreign Assistance Act and cut off all U.S. aid to Pakistan except humanitarian food assistance.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, however, prompted a reversal of priorities that brought regional security issues to the forefront. Public Law 97-113, signed in December 1981, specifically allowed the President to waive the application of Section 669 in Pakistan's case until September 30, 1987, subject to certain conditions. The introduction to Section 620E of the foreign assistance act, which provided for the waiver, made clear that Congress, at the urging of the President, took this action in the context of the threat to Pakistan from Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

30/ Aiyar, Swaminathan S. Dhruva an N-Bomb Spinner. Indian Express (New Delhi), August 10, 1985. p. 1,7. This report's assertion that Dhruva could produce 300 kg. of plutonium per year appears overstated by about a factor of ten. Economic Times (New Delhi), August 16, 1985; Spector, Leonard S. Nuclear Proliferation Today. New York: Vintage Books, 1985. p. 55.

At the same time, Congress reiterated its continuing concern about the proliferation issue and Pakistani nuclear activities. It modified Section 670 (Glenn Amendment) of the foreign assistance act -- another nonproliferation section -- to cutoff U.S. aid if Pakistan or any other non-weapons state acquired, transferred or exploded a nuclear device.

Both the Reagan administration and congressional supporters of Pakistan expressed confidence that Pakistan's dependence on U.S. aid and its concern about the threat posed by the Soviets in Afghanistan would deter Islamabad from exploding a nuclear weapon. In addition, Administration officials sought to persuade skeptics in Congress that the United States would reduce Pakistan's incentives to go nuclear by providing it with conventional arms such as the F-16 fighter bomber.

Status of Pakistan's Nuclear Program

Strong circumstantial evidence suggests that Pakistan continues to pursue the nuclear option on a high priority basis. The Administration has not been able to provide Congress with reassuring information to the contrary. Several incidents have heightened concern that Islamabad is pressing ahead with its effort to acquire the capability to explode a nuclear device:

-- In February 1984 the head of the uranium enrichment program, Dr. A. Q. Khan, boasted that Pakistan's scientists had achieved a low enrichment capability and could produce a nuclear bomb if so instructed by the political authorities.

-- In June 1984, U.S. Customs officials arrested three Pakistan nationals in Houston and charged them with attempting illegally to export 50 ultra-high speed electronic switches ("krytrons") of a type that could be used to trigger a nuclear warhead. The principal in the case was later linked to Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission. 31/

31/ Hersh, Seymour M. Pakistani in U.S. Sought to Ship A-Bomb Trigger. The New York Times. February 25, 1985. A1, A8.

-- In May 1985, the Pakistani Ambassador to India claimed that Pakistan could enrich uranium to 5 percent (which he noted was less than the 90 percent enrichment required for a bomb), and acknowledged in response to a question that in principle building a bomb was a simple task. 32/

-- On July 11, 1985, ABC News reported that according to "U.S. intelligence" Pakistan had acquired an undetermined number of krytrons from an unknown source and had successfully tested a nuclear warhead firing mechanism using conventional explosives. 33/

Despite these provocative statements and incidents, it remains unclear how far Pakistan has progressed towards a nuclear weapons capability. A case can be made that such statements and actions are designed to suggest that Pakistan has a greater ability to make nuclear weapons than it actually does. 34/

While the production of enough material for one or two explosive devices could be achieved through relatively small scale processes, the industrial requirements for building even a small nuclear arsenal are formidable, especially for a state as industrially backward as Pakistan. Among other things, enrichment and reprocessing both are advanced technologies that require unusual design and engineering resources as well as special materials and parts, and well trained technicians and operators not usually to be found in developing countries of Pakistan's class.

32/ FBIS. South Asia. Daily Report. May 8, 1985. p. E1.

33/ Transcript, ABC "Good Morning America," July 11, 1985 (John Scali).

34/ Pakistan may want to portray an image as a potential nuclear weapon state in order to signal India and possibly other countries that it has a bomb capability or to increase its international prestige. The circumstances of the krytron case, coupled with the statements of Pakistani authorities, could plausibly be related to an elaborate effort to persuade India that Pakistan already had a nuclear weapons capability -- if not a weapon in being -- and gain the presumed deterrence advantages of a bomb in advance of actually having one. In particular, the modus operandi of the Pakistanis who sought to export the krytrons suggests that the participants, including apparently the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission, were exceedingly unmindful of or unconcerned about the consequences of discovery, or incompetent, or both. Such image building also may result from complicated internal developments -- such as bureaucratic or political power rivalries not clearly understood outside the Islamabad policy-making elite.

India's own difficulties in seeking nuclear self-sufficiency, including the loss of several years in bringing critically needed heavy water plants on line, suggests that even a relatively advanced developing country is likely to experience major problems in translating generally known technological concepts into reliably working plants and equipment.

Despite these uncertainties, information in the public domain indicates that Pakistan is near to the capability to produce at least a few nuclear explosives. Moreover, regardless of its actual capabilities, Pakistan's persistent actions have been sufficiently provocative as to endanger congressional support for the U.S.-Pakistan security relationship.

U.S. Policy Options

A number of measures have been suggested to limit more effectively Pakistan's suspicious nuclear activities. The difficulty for both the Administration and Congress is that while the United States has a strong continuing stake in the security of Pakistan, that country apparently perceives an absolute necessity to achieve at least the capability of building nuclear weapons.

During 1985, Congress has acted on legislation aimed at limiting Pakistan's freedom to pursue its nuclear explosives program. Section 902 of the foreign assistance authorization act for FY 1986 (PL 99-83) conditions U.S. aid on greater assurances from the President concerning Pakistan's nuclear activities. The act amends Section 620E of the foreign assistance act to prohibit U.S. aid, and sales or transfer of military assistance or technology to Pakistan, unless the President certifies to Congress that (1) Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device and

(2) the proposed U.S. assistance will reduce significantly the risk that Pakistan will possess a such a device. 35/

Supporters of this formula argued that a legislative restriction on the possession of a weapon would act as a more certain deterrent than government-to-government warnings, such as reportedly were conveyed in a letter from President Reagan to President Zia last fall. 36/ They also felt that Pakistan would stop short of building or testing a weapon so long as it desires to receive additional U.S. military equipment and maintain an unimpeded flow of spare parts for its F-16's and other high technology weapons. The obvious limitation of the amendment is that it does not address specifically Pakistan's efforts to produce weapons grade nuclear materials.

Another 1985 legislative initiative seeks to prevent a repetition of the Houston "krytron" incident. In the Houston case, which might have offered a tactically ideal opportunity to demonstrate the seriousness of U.S. non-proliferation policy, the primary defendant was convicted of a lesser charge and deported. Failure of the United States to react more vigorously to an apparent Pakistani effort to subvert U.S. export controls was allegedly due to poor coordination among U.S. agencies. 37/ Critics of the Reagan administration's non-proliferation policy saw the U.S. government's handling of the case as indicating, at a minimum, a strong inclination to avoid any confrontation that might jeopardize U.S. security interest in Pakistan.

Section 1204 of the foreign assistance authorization act (PL 99-83) expands section 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act to forbid U.S. military

35/ For further information on this legislation see CRS Issue Brief 85112, U.S. Assistance to Pakistan: Foreign Aid Facts (periodically updated).

36/ Wall Street Journal, October 25, 1984. p. 37.

37/ Hersh, Seymour H. Pakistani in U.S. Sought to Ship A-Bomb Trigger. New York Times, February 25, 1985. p. A1, A8.

and economic assistance to countries that illegally attempt to export from the United States material, equipment or technology which would contribute significantly to the ability of that country to manufacture a nuclear explosive device. This provision is subject to the existing Presidential waiver authority in Section 670. The amendment, first proposed by the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Rep. Stephen Solarz, reflects congressional concern about the implications of the Houston krytron case. 38/

The effect of the amendment could be to raise significantly the cost of violating U.S. law and, in theory, put new teeth into U.S. efforts of some years' standing to deny Pakistan access to such dual-use technology. The amendment applies to any country, not just Pakistan, that might in the future violate U.S. laws governing the export of nuclear related technology. 39/ Its effectiveness would seem to depend on whether official foreign involvement could be established and on good faith efforts by the Executive branch to apply the law. Unlike several previous congressional efforts to constrain Pakistan's nuclear activities, the Administration did not oppose the amendment

Tighten Presidential Certification Requirements

In the event that these measures fail to inhibit Pakistan's suspicious nuclear activities, Congress could impose even stronger certification requirements on the President as a condition to allowing U.S. aid. In the past, some Members of Congress advocated presenting Islamabad with a choice

38/ U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985; report on H.R. 1555 together with dissenting, supplemental, and additional views. 99th Congress, 1st Session. U.S. Govt. Print. Off. April 11, 1985. p. 99.

39/ Reportedly, both Israel and Pakistan obtained U.S. krytrons. In May 1985 it was reported that Israel, which is widely suspected of having a covert nuclear weapons capability, had between 1979 and 1983 illegally obtained U.S. made krytrons. Washington Post, May 14, 1985. p. 20.

between its nuclear program and access to U.S. assistance and high technology arms. For instance, Congress could resurrect a formula similar to that adopted in March 1984 by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, later reversed in a subsequent vote, which would have forbidden arms sales and military assistance to Pakistan unless the President certified to Congress that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device and was not (in his judgment) acquiring the means to produce one (emphasis added). 40/

The difficulty with this formula was pointed out by the Committee's majority in explaining why, in April 1984, they adopted a less demanding certification requirement similar to that recently enacted during action on the FY 1986 foreign assistance authorization act (PL 99-83). Explaining the reversal, the Committee's majority, by a vote of 9 to 8, expressed doubt that the President could make the assurances demanded in the original version, and noted their belief "that this amendment if it led to the termination of our security assistance programs could convince the Pakistanis that the rapid acquisition of a nuclear device is the only way to provide for their national security." 41/

Link Arms Sales to Nuclear Restraint

Another tactic would link U.S. arms sales to evidence that Pakistan was not pursuing the nuclear weapons option. Performance could be measured against criteria that reasonably would be within the ability of U.S. intelligence to

40/ U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1984; Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, on S. 2582. April 18, 1984. 98th Congress, 2nd session. Senate Report No. 98-400. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1984. p. 58-59, 114.

41/ Ibid., p. 59.

verify. These might include evidence that Pakistan is not reprocessing significant amounts of spent nuclear fuel, has limited its enrichment program to a relatively small number of centrifuge assemblies, was not enriching uranium beyond the low enriched stage (about 3-5 percent) and was not conducting trigger detonation tests. 42/ Of course, Pakistan could retaliate against such linkage by downgrading its security relationship with the United States or its cooperation in funneling aid to the Afghan resistance. This risk could be minimized, however, by making the linkages privately or even more implicitly, i.e., allowing Pakistan to come to its own conclusion that system-X will not be approved for sale until it abandons certain nuclear activities.

Thus far, there is no evidence in the public record that any specific U.S. sales have been made contingent on Pakistan's nuclear behavior. Except for normal caution about technology leakage -- including some evidence of concern about whether Pakistan might have in the past transferred U.S. technology to China -- and an unwillingness to sell equipment with obvious nuclear weapons applications, the main criteria for arms sales to Pakistan appears to be what is affordable under prevailing U.S. FMS credit levels or other external financing. 43/

The impending negotiations on U.S. aid and arms transfers beyond the current six-year program would appear to offer a ready-made opportunity to link

42/ Reportedly, President Reagan warned President Zia in a September 1984 letter not to carry out enrichment of uranium at the Kahuta plant beyond five percent lest it jeopardize U.S. aid and arms sales, and later received assurances that Pakistan would respect this "marker." Henderson, Simon. Financial Times (London). December 7, 1984. p. 3.

43/ Inferential evidence suggests that the issues are highly departmentalized, with the Department of Defense taking the lead on arms sales and defense relations and the Department of State taking the lead on the nuclear issue. As a result, U.S. nonproliferation policy may lack the desired impression of seriousness. South Asian governments often instinctively attribute contradictions in U.S. policy to some higher and usually non-existent purpose, with the inevitable result that mixed signals yield wrong signals.

arms sales to nuclear restraint. First, the use of arms sales and aid as a lever would not require disavowing any previous commitments. Second, the present waiver to the Symington amendment for Pakistan expires on September 30, 1987, which should give the Administration considerable leverage in pressing its viewpoint with Pakistan.

Pressure Both Pakistan and India to Forego Nuclear Weapons

A third possibility would be for the United States to undertake a diplomatic effort to call attention to the risk of proliferation in India and Pakistan and get both countries to strengthen their commitment not to build nuclear weapons. Calling attention to both countries' programs might reduce Pakistan's sense of being unfairly singled out, and would address a growing threat of Indian proliferation -- an important end in itself. This tactic would tend to undercut any effort by Islamabad and New Delhi to use the others' activities as justification for their own decisions to build nuclear weapons.

The prospects for success of this option depend heavily on how willing India and Pakistan each may be to forego nuclear weapons so long as the other does not develop or deploy them. Based on the statements of their leaders, neither country wishes to go beyond acquiring the capability to produce such weapons. If these statements reflect actual intent, some room may exist for an agreement or understanding -- either public or private -- that neither will go beyond a certain point. 44/

44/ It would appear that such an objective underlay a September 1985 visit to India and Pakistan by Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Michael H. Armacost, and National Security Council staff member, Donald R. Fortier. Reportedly, the officials were to discuss American concerns about Pakistan's nuclear program and the possibility of an Indian pre-emptive strike. According to one press report, the officials would advocate a pact between the two countries that would include mutual guarantees against either going nuclear -- an idea India has repeatedly rejected in the past. Weinraub, Bernard. U.S. Concerned on Atom Peril in Subcontinent. New York Times. September 13, 1985. p. 1.

INDIA-PAKISTAN TENSION

U.S. policy towards Pakistan remains seriously complicated by the pervasive India-Pakistan rivalry, which has resulted in three past wars and now has a nuclear component. Continued tension and suspicion between Pakistan and India constitute a major obstacle to U.S. efforts to combat Soviet influence in the region since a new India-Pakistan conflict could be exploited by the Soviet Union in various ways to the disadvantage of the United States. Although few analysts would judge India a client state of the Soviet Union, New Delhi's quasi-alliance relationship with Moscow as evidenced in the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship and an ongoing military supply relationship, gives an added negative dimension to this endemic rivalry.

Background and Analysis

India's preoccupation with the U.S.-Pakistan security relationship is puzzling to many who see the current balance as lopsided in India's favor. The roots of India's attitude appear to lie in a profound if seldom admitted sense of vulnerability to internal destabilization and a preoccupation with remaining the dominant power in the region. ^{45/} From the Indian perspective, Pakistan still aspires to reverse history and fulfill its ambition to control all of the contiguous Muslim majority areas of South Asia, including Indian-held Kashmir. Despite its own massive arms buildup, India sees the balance of

^{45/} The current separatist movement among Sikhs in India's strategic Punjab province is a case in point. The unrest, which India accuses Pakistan of aiding and abetting, has tied down several divisions of the Indian Army and effectively rendered unreliable two Sikh regiments that played a vital role in past India-Pakistan conflicts.

forces on the ground as too even for comfort, and claims to fear the introduction of high technology U.S. arms into the equation.

New Delhi's concerns are mirrored and intensified in Islamabad. Pakistan, which saw its rebellious Eastern wing "liberated" by the Indian Army in the 1971 war that resulted in the creation of Bangladesh, fears Indian hegemony and seeks constantly to maintain or increase its freedom of action and achieve internationally recognized equality of status, if not of military or economic power. Many Pakistanis believe that Indians do not accept the rationale for the partition of the subcontinent in 1947, and will seek at an opportune moment to reabsorb the severed parts of former British India. To many Pakistanis, possession of even a few nuclear weapons would provide a guarantee against their worst fears coming to pass.

Pakistani analysts profess also to believe that the most likely way for the Soviets to get at Pakistan would be to inspire an Indian attack that, if successful, would reduce Pakistan to a weak and pliant state, isolated from the United States and incapable of opposing Moscow's plans. Most western analysts believe that India would not sacrifice its own national interests to please the Soviets, and argue that these interests presently would not likely be served by another war with Pakistan. But whether arising out of an Indian raid on Pakistan's nuclear facilities, an attack by either for some strategic real estate, or mutual misperception and miscalculation, a new India-Pakistan war is the potential achilles heel of the U.S. position in the region.

A new India-Pakistan conflict probably would benefit the Soviet Union. If the United States were to support Pakistan in such a contingency, it would poison relations with India and possibly fail to protect Pakistan from additional losses of territory. U.S. neutrality would more surely doom Pakistan and the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. As in 1971, China would likely

be deterred from coming to Pakistan's assistance by the risk of Soviet retaliation. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, would be well poised to orchestrate a negotiated settlement which would make it the security arbiter of the subcontinent for years to come.

U.S. Policy Options

Various proposals have been made in the U.S. Congress and elsewhere to address U.S. concerns about tension between India and Pakistan. The most sweeping change would be a policy that the United States should not sell Pakistan any weapons system that was perceived by India as threatening, and that in general the United States should look to democratic India as the dominant power of the subcontinent and the main, long term barrier to Soviet expansion. At the other extreme would be a policy of raising the U.S. security commitment to Pakistan to a point of making an Indian attack unthinkable. ^{46/}

Neither of these options is compatible with regional realities. The first underestimates the degree to which Indian policy is premised on the Pakistani and Chinese "threats," no matter what U.S. policy might be, and hence links India for the indefinite future to a major dependency on the Soviet Union for arms, security support and military technology. This carries with it an automatic reluctance to play the role of a regional leader in opposing Soviet policy. The second would tend to commit the United States to support Pakistan even when its policy might be unwise or foolhardy, which is a dangerous superpower policy. Moreover, in the eyes of most Pakistanis, the

^{46/} During impromptu remarks at a news conference last August the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Deane Hinton, seemed to suggest that the United States might intervene in the event of an "act, committed by anybody, of flagrant aggression" against Pakistan. The remarks set off a chorus of protest in India, and reportedly "caused consternation in the State Department." Claiborne, William. U.S. Official Holds Talks in India on Aid Row. Washington Post, October 23, 1984. p. A20; Dua, H.K. Indo-U.S. Relations Touch New Low. Indian Express. October 16, 1984. p. 1,7.

commitment would lack credibility due to the previous failure of the United States to intervene effectively on Pakistan's behalf.

The dilemma for U.S. policy makers now is to give Pakistan confidence that the United States is a reliable security partner while persuading India that U.S. aid to Pakistan does not threaten India's security. Realistically, these are probably incompatible objectives. In the end, U.S. policy is largely hostage to tensions over which Washington has little or no control. However, there may be some scope for decreasing Indian apprehensions without reducing Pakistani confidence.

Limit Arms Sales to Pakistan

One obvious option for the United States is to be more selective in what arms it gives Pakistan, avoiding the sale of systems that India finds especially threatening. This would involve more clearly tying weapons systems to the Afghanistan situation, or denying systems that might be appropriate to the Soviet/Afghan threat but would especially aggravate U.S.-India and India-Pakistan relations. For example, Indian and other critics found the sale of the Harpoon anti-ship missile to Pakistan as unduly provocative since it was not credibly related to the threat from Afghanistan.

A major problem with this option is that most weapons systems that would be applicable to the Soviet/Afghan threat could also be used against India. Moreover, Pakistan would have to reconsider its security relationship with the United States if it could not meet its basic arms needs. The best opportunity for the United States to manage this problem might be to focus more on linking arms sales to Pakistan's nuclear behavior, rather than on simply denying systems that appear provocative to India. This would almost certainly involve the types of weapons that most trouble India. If successful, this strategy

would allow Pakistan to acquire systems that India opposes, but New Delhi at least would have the consolation that Pakistan was not carrying out a nuclear weapons program under an American security umbrella.

Promote a Reorientation of Pakistan's Military Dispositions

Without questioning Pakistan's basic fear of India, the United States could encourage and support confidence building measures between India and Pakistan, perhaps within the framework of the presently stalled normalization talks, in order to lower India-Pakistan tensions and at the same time give more credibility to Pakistan's northern defenses. Some steps on the part of Pakistan which have been suggested by analysts include constructing defensive positions and improving lateral communications along the Pakistan-Afghan frontier, deploying additional radars, ground-to-air missiles and anti-tank weapons in the same area, and relocating some infantry units away from the Punjab plains along the border with India. A limited shift of Pakistan's armed forces towards the Afghan frontier could be proposed as part of a comprehensive review to determine U.S. aid levels after the expiration of the current six-year security assistance program.

One test of U.S. and Pakistani credibility could be how Pakistan deploys the Stinger ground-to-air missiles now being provided on an expedited basis in response to air attacks from Afghanistan. If deployed on the plains rather than on the Afghan frontier, they will reinforce New Delhi's suspicion that Pakistan is merely using the Afghan situation as a pretext to build up its defenses against India.

Enhance U.S. Ties with India

During the past year the Reagan administration has taken several steps to address the liabilities imposed by Indian antagonism to the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Last Fall, President Reagan approved an initiative to improve U.S. ties with India, including an effort to reach an accord on technology transfer. In May 1985, India and the United States initialed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on technology transfer that would facilitate the sale of technology and computers to India in exchange for guarantees concerning the protection of U.S. technology from diversion to third countries or for unauthorized purposes. The MOU does not specifically provide for the transfer of military technology, although it provides a basis for such sales. Its most significant aspect is that it alleviates a major irritant -- the previous unwillingness of the United States government to allow or approve expeditiously the sale of computers and other medium level technology to India -- and paves the way for a substantial increase in American involvement through trade and investment in the Indian economy.

Meanwhile, India seems to share the U.S. interest in Pakistan's survival as an independent country, and in preventing a Soviet dominated subcontinent. It is unlikely that India would wish to see the collapse of Pakistan if this meant the further intrusion of Soviet forces into the region.

That the United States and India agree on that fundamental, however, does not guarantee that they will accept each other's more immediate concerns. The United States can be expected to continue to seek Indian support for its effort to make Afghanistan inhospitable to the Soviet Union and to seek a "responsible" Indian policy towards regional stability. This includes continued disavowal of nuclear weapons, a more magnanimous policy towards its neighbors, and greater understanding of U.S. security cooperation with Pakistan. India, which

apparently finds the U.S. role in the region of more immediate concern than that of the Soviets in Afghanistan, will continue to seek to limit the kinds and quantity of arms that the United States provides to Pakistan and frown on the U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean region. At the same time, New Delhi will also seek to realize fully the benefits of U.S. technology transfer and obtain cooperation in its efforts to combat Sikh extremism.

As a result of the June 1985 visit of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, there is some promise of a more productive U.S.-India relationship. In tone if not in substance India has shown more sensitivity to U.S. concerns about Afghanistan. If only for tactical reasons, India has, for the first time, differentiated between its objections to U.S. arms to Pakistan and its concerns about Pakistan's nuclear program, judging the latter more important. 47/ In the aftermath of the apparent bombing of an Air India plane by Sikh extremists, with the tragic loss of over 300 lives, India reversed past practice and forcefully condemned the highjacking of a TWA aircraft by Lebanese Shi'a Moslem terrorists. 48/ Whether these limited steps towards better U.S.-India relations are followed by further progress or are lost in a rebuilding of tensions over now-traditional disputes could have an important influence on Pakistan's security and the prospects for the spread of Soviet influence in southern Asia.

47/ FBIS Daily Report. South Asia. June 18, 1985. p. E1.

48/ Washington Post, June 29, 1985.

APPENDIX

U.S. ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN (millions \$)*

	FY81	FY82	FY83	FY84	FY85 (est)	FY86 (req)
Development						
Aid	-	-	-	-	50.0	25.0
(Loans)	-	-	-	-	(37.8)	(3.5)
(Grants)	-	-	-	-	(12.2)	(21.5)
Other						
Economic						
Aid	0.5	2.7	2.9	3.4	2.0	4.5
(Loans)	-	-	-	-	-	-
(Grants)	(0.5)	(2.7)	(2.9)	(3.4)	(2.0)	(4.5)
Food Aid	58.1	97.1	75.8	81.5	68.1	52.3
(Loans)	(47.5)	(47.5)	(47.5)	(50.0)	(50.0)	(50.0)
(Grants)	(10.6)	(50.0)	(28.3)	(31.5)	(18.1)	(2.3)
ESF	-	100.0	200.0	225.0	200.0	250.0
(Loans)	-	(34.0)	(67.0)	(75.0)	(39.7)	(79.0)
(Grants)	-	(66.0)	(133.0)	(150.0)	(160.3)	(171.0)
Military						
Aid	-	0.6	260.8	300.8	325.9	326.2
(Loans)	-	-	(260.0)	(300.8)	(325.9)	(325.0)
(Grants)	-	(0.6)	(0.8)	(0.8)	(0.9)	(1.2)
TOTAL	76.8	200.8	539.5	610.7	646.0	658.0
(Loans)	(47.5)	(81.5)	(374.5)	(425.0)	(452.5)	(457.5)
(Grants)	(29.3)	(119.3)	(165.0)	(185.7)	(193.5)	(200.5)

Total U.S. aid FY46-85: \$8,019.32 million (current \$)
 \$20,700.72 million (constant 1986 \$)

Pakistan's rank among U.S. aid recipients: FY85 - 4th
 FY86 - 4th

<u>OTHER AID DONORS</u>	1981	1982	1983	1984
Int'l Agencies	479.3	555.6	581.1	643.4
Western Countries	366.9	363.6	249.4	n/a
OPEC Countries	76.4	99.0	80.8	n/a
Communist Countries	20.0	-	27.7	n/a

* U.S. Foreign Assistance and Other Aid Donors Data were taken from Agency for International Development and from Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) publications.

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